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Freedom of Religion or Belief and Freedom of Association: 





1 Introduction  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and most other international human 
rights instruments are, fundamentally, perceived as offering protection to the rights of the 
individual. At the same time, several human rights obligations entail a collective dimension. 
Article 11 of the ECHR, which protects freedom of assembly and association, is illustrative of 
this,1 as is Article 9 concerning the freedom of religion or belief.2 The latter protects the right 
of everyone ‘either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.’3  
There are other markers of collective interests in the ECHR that states are obligated to 
protect. As such, the State may restrict manifestations of religion when such limitations ‘are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, 
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others’.4 Clearly, the public’s safety, order, health or morals envisages or requires 
                                                        
1 The provision reads: ‘11.1 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. 
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
this Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of 
the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.’ Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), Council of Europe Treaty Series 
No. 5, Art. 9 (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953, text as amended by Protocols 
No. 11 and No. 14), Art. 11 (Hereafter, ECHR). 
2 In this chapter, the term ‘freedom of religion’ is used as a shorthand for a freedom that includes the belief 
aspect.  
3 ECHR, Art. 9.  
4 The legitimate aims that can be pursued to restrict freedom of association and assembly differ from those 
enumerated in the second paragraph of the freedom of religion clause. In addition to the protection of public 
order, health or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, the State may legitimately 
restrict art. 11 rights in pursuance of national security and the prevention of crimes. ECHR, Art. 11(2). 
  
the State to protect collective goals; moreover, ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ may take 
the form of an individual’s own interests, but they may also be those of a group of individuals 
or of a legal entity such as a church, or other religious or belief-based organisation. 
 In the light of this, tensions between individual and collective interests, whether 
religious or philosophical, can be foreseen. Such a binary reading however does not depict 
faithfully the range of tensions that exist in practice, and, indeed, the way these tensions play 
out before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the now defunct European 
Commission of Human Rights (ECommHR).5 Whilst the admissibility criteria under the 
ECHR as interpreted by the Convention mechanisms provide that Article 9 complaints may 
be brought by individuals, groups of individuals or legal entities with ‘religious or 
philosophical purposes’6 against the State only, the State itself may be a surrogate, depending 
on the case, for any one of these forms of interest. In other words, an ‘applicant v. Respondent 
State’ complaint relating to Article 9 may reflect a conflict between an individual, a group, or 
legal entity, respectively and the State pursuing a broad range of public interests; it may also 
reflect a conflict between individuals, between individuals and collectivities (such as 
unincorporated groups or legal entities), or between collectivities themselves.  
The aim of this chapter is to map those conflicts where either a group or a legal entity 
is involved in Article 9 jurisprudence  in order to explore the intersection between freedom of 
religion and freedom association in such cases. In developing the analysis, the chapter finds 
inspiration in the intersectionality framework pioneered by Kimberly Crenshaw, which 
challenges the single-category mind-set of anti-discrimination law.7 Intersectionality, as 
applied in gender, sexualities and post-colonial studies, describes the interaction of different 
identities such as gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexuality: ‘Instead of merely summarizing 
the effects of one, two or three oppressive categories, adherents to the concept of 
intersectionality stress the interwoven nature of these categories and how they can mutually 
strengthen or weaken each other’.8  
In this chapter, our interest lies with the processes exposed by intersectionality – that 
is, the interaction between categories and the effects of such interaction – but not in relation to 
the above-mentioned identities. Instead, the chapter adapts (as opposed to adopts) the concept 
                                                        
5 Protocol 11 to the ECHR altered the human rights machinery by abolishing the ECommHR and allowing direct 
access to the ECtHR; Protocol 11, E.T.S. 155, entered into force 1 November 1998.  
6 See discussion infra at section 2 of this chapter. 
7 See, for example, K. Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist politics’, University of Chicago Legal Forum 
(1989), 139-167.  
8 G. Winker, and N. Degele, ‘Intersectionality as Multi-level Analysis: Dealing with Social Inequality’, 18 
European Journal of Women’s Studies 1 (2011), p. 51. 
  
of intersectionality towards the interaction of rights.9 Specifically, the chapter explores how 
the interaction between freedom of religion and freedom of association plays out in the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg mechanisms. Intersectionality allows us to test whether the 
interaction of these rights has the potential to enhance the protection of religious collectivities, 
and consider whether, in doing so, it weakens the claims of individuals or groups of 
individuals of which they are comprised.  
Structurally, the paper is divided into four parts. Following this introduction, the 
second part will examine the jurisprudential developments concerning the recognition of 
religious and belief communities as rights-holders under Article 9. Establishing the capacity 
of legal religious entities to hold and claim religious rights under the Convention, leads us to 
an exploration, in the third part of the chapter, of church v. State relations. The focus here will 
be on the interplay between Articles 9 and 11 when there is an assertion of a right to religious 
autonomy and the examination of the effects of this intersection in various contexts. Fourthly, 
in exploring conflicts between individuals and groups of individuals, respectively, and 
churches, the chapter aims to expose the role that intersectionality plays in asserting the 
interests of the latter over the former.  
 
 
2 The Church as an Article 9 Rights-holder 
 
The individualistic fashion in which most rights are phrased in human rights instruments 
reinforces the perception, alluded to in the introduction to this paper, that the rights-holder of 
a human right is the individual human person alone or in community with others. Article 9 of 
the ECHR is no exception. As Theo van Boven put it, ‘it is the individual human person, 
whilst part of social or cultural relations of a community nature, who is the beneficiary of 
rights’.10 Undoubtedly, a group of individuals acting together as an unincorporated entity can 
acquire rights and therefore invoke breaches of such rights under Article 9 of the ECHR.11 
                                                        
9 An application of intersectionality to ‘categories’ of human rights, as opposed to oppressive categories or 
identities, has been previously undertaken in I. Cismas, ‘The Intersection of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights and Civil and Political Rights’ in E. Riedel, G. Giacca, and C. Golay (eds), Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights in International Law. Contemporary Issues and Challenges, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), pp. 448-472.  
10 T. van Boven, ‘Categories of Rights’, in D. Moeckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran (eds.) International Human 
Rights Law (2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 146.  
11 The admissibility criteria in Art. 34 of the ECHR stipulate that the ECtHR ‘may receive applications from any 
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of 
the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto.’  
  
However, whether a religious legal entity can also hold and claim rights under Article 9 has 
been, particularly in the early Strasbourg jurisprudence, far from clear.  
In order to portray the evolution the Strasbourg case law has made over time in the 
present regard, reference can be made to an early decision (1968) in which the ECommHR 
had denied the right of the Church of Scientology to bring a claim under the Convention 
concerning alleged breaches of Article 9.12 It held that the Church of Scientology as a 
corporation was a non-governmental organization – thus meeting one of the two criteria under 
the Convention for having standing to bring a claim.13 However, as ‘a legal, and not a natural 
person’ it was ‘incapable of having or exercising the rights mentioned in Article 9’,14 and 
therefore it failed to meet the victim requirement in – the then – Article 25.15  
It is interesting to note that the applicant church did not invoke Article 11 and 
therefore did not request that Article 9 be read in light of the right to freedom of association. 
Nor did the Commission consider such a reading ex officio.16 Hindsight allows us to speculate 
whether the intersection of these rights would have resulted in a different outcome. What was 
at stake here were restrictions on the associative life of the church, given that the ‘government 
has undertaken an explicit campaign to limit the effectiveness of a religious group rather than 
to restrict the rights of individual members’.17 As Carolyn Evans notes, in such cases it is the 
church that would have been the ‘appropriate and effective body to enforce the provisions 
relating to freedom of religion.’18  
 In 1979, in X and Church of Scientology v. Sweden, the Commission revisited and 
reversed its position:  
 
When a church body lodges an application under the Convention, it does so in reality, 
on behalf of its members. It should therefore be accepted that a church body is capable 
of possessing and exercising the rights contained in Article 9(1) in its own capacity as 
a representative of its members … Accordingly, the Church of Scientology, as a non-
                                                        
12 Church of X v. the United Kingdom, European Commission on Human Rights, 7 December 1968, No. 
3798/68, pp. 4–5.  
13 Ibid., pp. 6-8.  
14 Ibid. 
15 See supra note 4. The standing requirements have been retained in the current Article 34, which has 
superseded Article 25. 
16 Note that in this case, the Commission had considered an alleged violation of Art. 2, Protocol 1 ex officio. 
17 C. Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), pp. 12-13. See also Church of X v. the United Kingdom, p. 3. 
18Ibid., p. 13. 
  
governmental organisation, can properly be considered to be an applicant within the 
meaning of Article 25(1) of the Convention.19  
  
In reversing its earlier finding, the ECommHR did not rely on Article 11, but drew on Article 
10 of the ECHR which had also been invoked by the applicant.20 The reasoning of the 
Commission is somewhat inconsistent. One would assume that if a church has the right to 
freedom of religion or belief in its own capacity, this cannot at the same time be dependent on 
it representing its members. Indeed, if (perfect) representation were to be required, a church 
would only be able to exercise Article 9 rights when (all) members of a church agreed on the 
specific issue in question – and ironically, this could amount to an interference with a 
church’s right to religious autonomy.  
The phrasing of this 1979 decision may be reflective of the Commission’s initial 
uneasiness in foregoing an individualistic approach to human rights. Even if the 
representation link is omitted – as indeed it has been in subsequent Strasbourg case law21 – 
the individual’s right to manifest her religion collectively with others remains the nucleus of 
church autonomy. Simply put, the right of a church to manifest religion is derived from the 
right of individuals to collectively manifest their religion. In the absence of this link back to 
the individual –not in the sense of being a representation of interests, but as the source of the 
derivation of the right – ‘the non-human nature of a legal entity that prevents it from 
exercising the right to life, for example, would similarly prevent a church from manifesting 
religion or a humanist organization from exercising beliefs … To admit today that a church 
has its own right to manifest religion is not to deny that the collective right of individuals lies 
at the origin of the church’s right.’22 In a similar vain, Evans has described the church’s 
Article 9 rights as resulting from the ‘aggregating of the rights’ of individuals to manifest 
                                                        
19 X and Church of Scientology v. Sweden, European Commission on Human Rights, 5 May 1979, No. 7805/77, 
p. 70. 
20 ‘This interpretation is in part supported from the first paragraph of Article 10 which, through its reference to 
“enterprises”, foresees that a non-governmental organisation like the applicant Church is capable of having and 
exercising the right to freedom of expression.’ Ibid., p. 70.  
21 Finska församlingen i Stockholm and Teuvo Hautaniemi v. Sweden, Decision of 11 April 1996, ECommHR, 
Application No. 24019/94, ECommHRDeicisions and Reports, vol. 62; Holy Monasteries v. Greece, judgment 
of 9 December 1994, Application Nos. 13092/87 and 13984/88. See also discussion in I. Cismas, Religious 
Actors and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 99-101 and infra at section 3 of this 
chapter. 
22 Cismas, supra note 20, p. 101. It should equally be noted that churches or organizations akin to churches are 
the sole legal entities recognized by the ECtHR as being able to manifest religion and bring an Article 9 claim. 
For further insights see M. D. Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 288-290. 
  
religion.23 There is, it should be noted, a subtle difference between aggregation and derivation 
– aggregation presupposes the summation of the interests of several individuals, which as a 
result may be given greater weight in a balancing test where the counterpart is a single 
individual or a smaller group of individuals. Whether resulting from derivation or aggregation 
of individual rights, the right of a church to religious freedom will ultimately reflect collective 
or social interests. When read in the light of Article 11 – a right strongly embodying a 
collective dimension – is freedom of religion, when held by a church, in effect a ‘super-
right’? This is a point to which we shall return in section 4 of this chapter.  
 
 
3 Church v. State Conflicts  
 
Cases related to the internal administration of a church as well as the (re)registration and 
recognition of a church by the State have given rise to the bulk of jurisprudence concerning 
the intersection of Articles 9 and 11. Applicants have sought to assert that protection should 
be afforded to the church by the State as against both State authorities and other actors in 
matters of internal government, administration and organization as well as the enjoyment of 
specific benefits (such as donations and subsidies), which the conferral of church status may 
bring about.  
 
3.1 The Intersection of Articles 9 and 11 as a Central Element in Church Autonomy and 
Registration Cases 
 
Whilst the church had already been recognized at the end of the 1970s as a rights-holder 
under Article 9, it was only subsequently that the concept of church autonomy gained traction 
in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In the landmark case Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, the 
State authorities had replaced the leadership of the Bulgarian Muslim community. In finding 
that there had been a violation of Article 9, the Court held ‘that the leadership of the faction 
led by Mr Hasan were unable to mount an effective challenge to the unlawful State 
interference in the internal affairs of the religious community and to assert its right to 
organisational autonomy, as protected by Article 9 of the Convention’.24  
 Interestingly, the Government’s claim had focused on Article 11; arguing that ‘not 
                                                        
23 Evans, supra note 16, p. 14. 
24 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, Application No. 30985/96, judgment of 26 October 2000, para. 104. 
  
every act motivated by religious belief could constitute a manifestation of religion, within the 
meaning of Article 9.’25 The Court disagreed, holding that dealing with the case ‘solely under 
Article 11 of the Convention, as suggested by the Government … would take the applicants’ 
complaints out of their context and disregard their substance.’26 As such, whilst considering 
that no separate issue arose under Article 11, freedom of association had, in this case, played 
a supportive role in relation to Article 9. In effect, the ECtHR anchored church autonomy in 
Article 9, read in the light of Article 11: 
 
Where the organisation of the religious community is at issue, Article 9 of the 
Convention must be interpreted in the light of Article 11, which safeguards associative 
life against unjustified State interference. Seen in this perspective, the believers’ right to 
freedom of religion encompasses the expectation that the community will be allowed to 
function peacefully, free from arbitrary State intervention. Indeed, the autonomous 
existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic 
society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords. It 
directly concerns not only the organisation of the community as such but also the 
effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion by all its active members. Were 
the organisational life of the community not protected by Article 9 of the Convention, 
all other aspects of the individual’s freedom of religion would become vulnerable.27 
 
The Court’s reading of Article 9 ‘in the light of Article 11’ empowers the right to freedom of 
religion or belief by religious or belief organisations. Importantly, this intersectional reading 
reveals a conceptualization of the relationship between members of a religious organization 
and the organization itself which is markedly different from that of the 1979 decision in X and 
Church of Scientology v. Sweden. By omitting the representation link which features in that 
earlier decision (‘the church body is capable of possessing and exercising the rights contained 
in Article 9(1) in its own capacity as a representative of its members’),28 it solves the problem 
of how a church might exercise Article 9 rights whilst not perfectly reflecting the position of 
its membership. Indeed, Article 11 jurisprudence has long held that it is not necessary for an 
association to represent its members – even less that it be a perfect representation – for it to be 
                                                        
25 Bulgaria noted that the Convention mechanisms generally examined an application invoking Article 9 and 
other Articles ‘under the other provisions relied on’. Ibid., para. 57.  
26 Ibid., para. 65. 
27 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, para. 62. 
28 Church of Scientology v. Sweden, Application No. 7805/77, Decision of 5 May 1979, p. 70. 
  
able to exercise and claim rights under the Convention. 
A series of (re)registration and recognition cases then drew on Hasan and Chaush and 
continued to anchor church autonomy in Article 9, with Article 11 employed to strengthen the 
associative dimension of religious freedom. For example, the Court found, inter alia, a 
violation of Article 9 read in light of Article 11 because: the Moldovan Government had 
denied recognition to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia;29 Russia had refused re-
registration to the Church of Scientology of Moscow30 and to register the Church of 
Scientology of St. Petersburg;31 Russia had dissolved the religious community of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and refused it re-registration;32 Russia had dissolved the 
Biblical Center of the Chuvash Republic;33 Austria had failed to grant in a timely manner 
legal personality to the Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and subsequently 
conferred legal personality of a more limited scope vis-à-vis other religious communities;34 
and Bulgaria had rejected the official recognition of an Indian religious movement35 and 
refused the registration of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.36In a scathing judgment in the 
Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, the Court inversed the relation between 
Article 9 and 11, and read the latter in the light of the former.37 The case concerned the refusal 
to register the Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army as a legal person. There is little explicit 
insight into why the Court chose to see freedom of religion as being the supportive right and 
consider the case mainly from the perspective of Article 11. However, the facts provide some 
indications. The Russian courts had considered the Salvation Army to be an organization of a 
‘paramilitary nature’.38 This would in turn suggest that the interference was pursued in the 
interest of national security and the prevention of crimes – legitimate aims listed under Article 
11(2), but not however under art. 9(2). As such, the Court approached the case from the 
perspective of Article 11 in connection with Article 9 in order to be able to consider the 
substance of these arguments, but nevertheless found there to be a violation of these rights.  
                                                        
29 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, Application No. 45701/99, judgment of 13 
December 2001. 
30 Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, Application No. 18147/02, judgment of 5 April 2007. See also 
Kimlya and Others v. Russia, Application Nos. 76836/01 and 32782/03, judgment of 1 October 2009.  
31 Church of Scientology of St. Petersburg and Others v. Russia, Application No. 47191/06, judgment of 2 
October 2014. 
32 Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, Application No. 302/02, judgment of 10 June 2010. 
33 Biblical Center of the Chuvash Republic v. Russia, Application No. 33203/08, judgment of 12 June 2014. 
34 Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, Application No. 40825/98, judgment of 31 
July 2008.  
35 Genov v. Bulgaria, 23 March 2017, European Court of Human Rights, No. 40524/08.  
36 Metodiev et autres c. Bulgarie, 15 June 2017, European Court of Human Rights, No. 58088/08. 
37 Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 5 October 2006, European Court of Human Rights, No. 
72881/01, paras. 75 and 98. 
38 Ibid., paras. 15, 17, 91. 
  
 
3.2 Articles 11 and 9 Intersection as the Basis of a Church’s Right to Fiscal Privilege? 
 
A similar reversal of the relation between Article 9 and 11 can be observed in Magyar 
Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others v. Hungary.39 This case revolved around new 
Hungarian legislation that sought, according to the Government, to prevent entities from 
claiming to pursue religious goals when they were ‘only striving for financial benefits’ 
associated with church status.40 Nine religious communities claimed that their loss of status as 
recognized churches – which resulted in their losing  revenue from personal income tax 
donations and state subsidies – and the discretionary nature of the re-registration process 
amounted to ‘a violation of their right to freedom of religion and was discriminatory, under 
Article 11, read in conjunction with Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention.’41 The Court 
reinforced its established case law according to which Articles 9 and 11 do not require the 
State to accord a specific legal status to religious communities. Rather, the Court took the 
view that these groups should have the possibility of acquiring legal capacity under civil law 
– which the applicants possessed.42 At the same time, the Court appears to have employed 
intersectionality to boost the collective dimension of freedom of religion: 
 
[R]eligious associations are not merely instruments for pursuing individual religious 
ends. In profound ways, they provide context within which individual self-
determination unfolds and serves pluralism in society. The protection granted to 
freedom of association for believers enables individuals to follow collective decisions 
to carry out common projects dictated by shared beliefs.43  
 
The Court first assessed a legitimate aim which the Government had not explicitly invoked. 
Whereas the Government had sought to justify its interference with the enjoyment of the right 
under Article 9(2) (rights and freedom of others and protection of public order), the ECtHR 
also considered, and accepted, ‘the legitimate of aim of preventing disorder and crime, for the 
purposes of Article 11(2), notably by attempting to combat fraudulent activities.’44 Despite 
                                                        
39 Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others v. Hungary, Application Nos. 70945/11, 23611/12, 
26998/12, 41150/12, 41155/12, 41463/12, 41553/12, 54977/12 and 56581/12), judgment of 8 April 2014.  
40 Ibid., paras. 62, 86. 
41 Ibid., para. 3. 
42 Ibid., para. 91. 
43 Ibid., para. 93.  
44 Ibid., para. 86. 
  
the generosity shown by the Court on this point, it went on to find that Hungary’s interference 
with the Article 11 and 9 rights of the applicants did not correspond to a ‘pressing social 
need’.45 In reaching this conclusion, it took into account – in what appears to have been an 
embrace of socio-legal methodology – that the loss of church status may result in ‘a situation 
of perceived inferiority which goes to the freedom to manifest one’s religion’46 and ‘may 
amplify prejudices against the adherents of such, often smaller communities, especially in 
case of religions with new or unusual teachings.’47  
For many positivist lawyers this analytical construction may seem forced; others 
might  see it as ‘wholly unsubstantiated and largely speculative’.48 Still, others will note that 
the ECtHR’s ‘sensitivity to the negative impact of governmental disapproval of certain 
religious groups’ and its ‘attention on the broader societal impact of state regulation on 
attitudes towards religious communities and believers, and the risk state regulation entails, 
[are] clearly not novel’.49 Be that as it may, the Magyar case emphasizes that – whilst 
representation of the members’ interests is not a condition for a  religious organization to 
exercise and claim rights under Article 9 – there is a strong link between a religious legal 
entity and its members, particularly when taking into account the concerns of the members at 
the state action taken in relation to the organisation. Beyond this, it is clear that the 
intersection between Articles 11 and 9 has had an effect on the normative understanding of 
the collective dimension of freedom of religion and has given a boost to its protection.  
It is precisely because of the Court’s focus on this intersection between Articles 11 
and 9 in Magyar that the judgment has been met with criticism. Carl Gardner argues that the 
Court has ‘short-circuited its own jurisprudence’.50 Drawing on the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Spano, joined by Judge Raimondi, he argues that the crux of the Magyar case was not 
de-registration – as was the case in many of the Russian cases, notably Moscow Branch of the 
Salvation Army – but a ‘reclassification for the purposes of receiving state benefit’.51 In other 
                                                        
45 Ibid., para. 115. 
46 Ibid., para. 94. See also A. Jusic, ‘Constitutional Changes and the Incremental Reductions of Collective 
Religious Freedom in Hungary’, 10 Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law (2016), 199-219, at pp. 
214-215. 
47 Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others v. Hungary, para. 92. 
48 Jusic, supra note 46, p. 215.  
49 R. Uitz, ‘Violation of Religion Rights in Hungary judgment’, ECHR Blog, 11 August 2014, 
<http://echrblog.blogspot.ch/2014/08/violation-of-religion-rights-in-hungary.html> 
50 C. Gardner, ‘A Road Cut through the Law to Get after Orbán?’, 3 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2014), 
p. 510. 
51 As a result the applicants were no longer incorporated churches but organisations performing religious 
activities. Only the former, enjoy fiscal privileges according to the 2011 Church Act. Ibid.; Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Spano, joined by Judge Raimondi, Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others v. Hungary, 
  
words, it is essentially a case concerning the loss of fiscal privileges, not the loss of legal 
entity status that allows religious organizations to pursue religious objects.  
In its judgment in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. the United Kingdom, 
a fiscal privileges case that preceded the Magyar case by only one month, the Court took a 
different course of action. It had assessed the proportionality of the interference resulting from 
the refusal to accord a statutory tax exemption to the applicant ‘only on the basis of whether 
there had been discrimination in the enjoyment of religious freedom rights pursuant to Article 
14 read together with Article 9’; this in turn had allowed the ECtHR to afford a larger margin 
of appreciation to the Respondent State.52 The concern is that by preferring the Articles 9 and 
11 intersectional approach in a fiscal privileges case, as opposed to the discrimination law 
approach (Articles 14 and 9), the Court ‘enlarges the scope of Article 9, taken alone and in 
conjunction with Article 11, as regards associative religious activity, to an extent that 
conforms neither to the text or purpose of these provisions nor to their development in the 
case-law’.53 The preference for the intersectional approach in Magyar, it can be argued, is 
difficult to understand absent a consideration of the specific Hungarian context.  
 
3.3 Context Matters 
  
As is the case with the intersection of identities, rights intersectionality is ‘time and context 
contingent, rather than fixed and ahistorical’54 and it is evident that in the church v. States 
conflicts mentioned above context mattered. Much of the jurisprudence on registration and 
recognition concerns States from the former communist bloc and religious associations that 
were not the church of the majority population.  
In Moldova, Russia and Bulgaria, for example, the Orthodox religion, the religion of 
the majority of the population, resurfaced strongly after the fall of atheistic communism. 
Today, the entanglement of religion with the State remains complex with strong (informal) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Application Nos. 70945/11, 23611/12, 26998/12, 41150/12, 41155/12, 41463/12, 41553/12, 54977/12 and 
56581/12), judgment of 8 April 2014, para. 4.  
52 Gardner, supra note 49; See also Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. the United Kingdom, 
European Court of Human Rights, 4 March 2014, No. 7552/0. Gardner further distinguishes Magyar from 
Association Les Témoins de Jéhovah c. France – the latter tax case was decided under Article 9 because the 
fiscal penalties to which the applicant had been subjected threatened its continued existence as a religious 
association. No similar threat has been noted in Magyar. Ibid. 
53 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Spano, joined by Judge Raimondi, supra note 49, para. 5. 
54 See W. Hulko, ‘The Time- and Context-contingent Nature of Intersectionality and Interlocking 
Oppressions’, 24 Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work (2009), pp. 44-55. 
  
linkages between the political class and the dominant Orthodox churches.55 Giovanni 
Barberini notes that ‘as a general rule these former Communist countries adopt a line of 
defence, at times hostile, that particularly manifests itself in the procedures for legal 
recognition … New religions are considered to be unknown subjects and interlocutors and 
therefore also potential factors of destabilization, strangers to the culture and to the tradition 
of the nation, within a democratic system still fragile and not experienced in pluralism.’56 The 
intersectionality of Articles 9 and 11 has been employed in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR to 
facilitate the protection of religious collectivities and in particular to strengthen the protection 
of newer or non-dominant religious communities. As such, ‘the ECtHR has prompted an 
inclusive transformation of the concept of church autonomy: the privilege of self-
administration, traditionally granted to a specific church by virtue of historic a affinities with 
the State, has become the right of all religious organizations’.57 This stream of case law 
protecting the collective dimension of religious freedom is very much anchored in the 
Kokkinakis dictum:  
 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic 
society” within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of 
the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their 
conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been 
dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.58 
 
Returning to the Magyar case, we can observe that (over)contextualised reasoning can present 
pitfalls. In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban allegedly initiated the 2011 legislation 
which stripped many smaller and minority churches of church status as ‘part of an overall 
push to control and stymie independent institutions that pose a potential threat to his rule.’59 
‘There must be a suspicion’, Gardner notes, ‘that this decision is influenced by the particular 
circumstances obtaining in Hungary, and the general concern about the state of human rights 
                                                        
55 See e.g., R. C. Blitt, ‘Russia’s Orthodox Foreign Policy: The Growing Influence of the Russian Orthodox 
Church in Shaping Russia’s Policies Abroad’, 33 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law  
(2011), p. 365.  
56 G. Barberini, ‘Religious Freedom in the Process of Democratization of Central and Eastern European States’, 
in S. Ferrari, C. W. Durham and E. A. Sewell (eds.), Law and Religion in Post-Communist Europe (Leuven: 
Peeters, 2003), p. 19. 
57 Cismas, supra note 20, pp. 123-124. 
58 Kokkinakis v. Greece, Application No. 14307/88, judgment of 25 May 1993, para. 31. 
59 L. Bayer, ‘Orbán’s “war of attrition” against churches’, Politico, 11 July 2016, 
<http://www.politico.eu/Article/orbans-war-of-attrition-against-churches/> 
  
and the rule of law’ in this country.60 Given that less intrusive measures could have been 
envisaged to ensure the legitimate aims invoked by the Hungarian Government,61 it is 
possible that the Court could have found in favour of the applicants had it performed the 
assessment of the interference under Article 14 and 9. Be that as it may, the problem remains: 
by employing intersectionality and ‘seeing the issues in a case like this as involving inference 
with freedom of association and religion, the Court has made established churches’ acquired 
rights to tax advantages harder for even the most liberal and democratic regime to review.’62  
 
 
4 Individual/Group v Church Conflicts  
 
As outlined in the introduction, in an Article 9 complaint a respondent state may represent the 
interests of a church. This happens when the State authorities restrict the rights of an 
individual or group of individuals in pursuance of the legitimate aim of ‘protecting the rights 
and freedoms’ of the church, specifically its religious autonomy. It is this type of conflicts to 
which we turn in this part of the chapter. The aim here is to analyse the role that Article 9 and 
11 intersectionality plays in the balancing test undertaken by the ECtHR in such cases. One 
question guides the analysis: Does intersectionality strengthen the position of the church vis-
à-vis the individual or group of individuals?  
This question presumes that church autonomy is a qualified right – were it to be 
absolute there would be little to balance. Elsewhere we have posited that church autonomy, 
being derived from the individual’s right to collectively manifest their beliefs (the second 
limb of Articles 9(1) and 11(1) qualified by Articles 9(2) and 11(2)), is not absolute.63 Even 
so, the church’s right to religious autonomy has received a high degree of protection in the 
jurisprudence of the Court, as illustrated by the dictum:  
 
but for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the 
Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether 
religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate.64  
  
                                                        
60 Gardner, supra note 49. 
61 See supra note 39. 
62 Gardner, supra note 49. 
63 Cismas, supra note 20, pp. 124-125. 
64 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, para. 78; Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine , judgment of 14 June 
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Indeed, conflicts between individuals or groups of individuals and religious organisations 
provide examples of such ‘very exceptional cases’. This analysis will therefore examine the 
development in the case law of limitations to religious autonomy and the role that Article 9 
and 11 intersectionality has played in this context.  
 
4.1 ‘Entry’ Restrictions 
 
One type of limitation to church autonomy that the ECtHR has endorsed are what can be 
termed as ‘entry’ restrictions. These can be described as a set of administrative measures that 
allow States to control the recognition and registration of the legal status of a church or 
religious organization. States are entitled to require religious bodies that wish to register and 
be recognized as specific religious legal entities to provide ‘a document setting out the 
fundamental principles of their religion’.65 This should allow the authorities to assess whether 
an association that was set up 'ostensibly in pursuit of religious aims' acts in accordance with 
legal provisions; that it represents no danger to a democratic society; and that its activity is 
not directed against the interests of public safety, public order, health, morals, or the rights 
and freedoms of others.66 Entry restrictions acknowledge that there may be tensions between 
the interests of a putative church or religious organization, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the interests of the state in preserving preserve democracy, guard public safety, order, health, 
morals – each of which can be reframed as individuals’ interests to which the state is merely 
giving expression – and to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals. Thus entry 
requirements allow for such potential conflicts between the church and the state as a proxy of 
individual interests to be navigated. Indeed, States have a positive obligation to ensure that 
such conflicts are prevented and that the rights and freedoms of individuals are secured.67 In 
the Refah Partisi case, the Court clarified that:  
 
such a power of preventive intervention on the State’s part is also consistent with 
Contracting Parties’ positive obligations under Article 1 of the Convention to secure 
the rights and freedoms of persons within their jurisdiction. Those obligations relate 
                                                        
65 Cârmuirea Spirituală a Musulmanilor din Republica Moldova v. Moldova, European Court of Human Rights, 
14 June 2005, No. 12282/02, pp. 4-5. 
66 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, Application No. 45701/99, judgment of 13 
December 2001, para. 113. 
67 See Gorzelik and Others v. Poland, European Court of Human Rights, 17 February 2004, No. 44158/98, para. 
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not only to any interference that may result from acts or omissions imputable to agents 
of the State or occurring in public establishments but also to interference imputable to 
private individuals within non-State entities.68 
 
Registration case law cautions that these restrictions are themselves to be restrictively 
construed in order to ensure the pluralism on which a democratic society is based.69 Clearly, 
Article 9 and 11 intersectionality has the effect of narrowing the State’s options when seeking 
to restrict access to legal status for the church or religious organizations:  
 
The State’s power to protect its institutions and citizens from associations that might 
jeopardise them must be used sparingly, as exceptions to the rule of freedom of 
association are to be construed strictly and only convincing and compelling reasons can 
justify restrictions on that freedom. Any interference must correspond to a “pressing 
social need”; thus, the notion “necessary” does not have the flexibility of such expressions 
as “useful” or “desirable”.70 
 
This dictum has relevance for the Court’s assessment of the proportionality of a State’s 
interference with Articles 9 and 11. The onus is on the government to demonstrate that the 
aims that it has pursued could not be addressed through less intrusive or restrictive means 
than the barring of access to the such legal. In the Magyar case, the ECtHR indicated that the 
Hungarian government had failed to avail itself of possible alternatives and had instead opted 
for de-registration en masse through the 2011 Church Act. Judicial control, the Court 
indicated, could have presented an alternative approach, as would the ‘dissolution of 
Churches proven to be of an abusive character’.71 Both of these options suggested by the 
Court make it clear that ‘entry’ restrictions have a ‘life beyond entry’; in other words, State 
authorities have the right – and indeed, as mentioned above, the obligation – to ensure that the 
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activities of churches continue to be conducive to public order, public safety, public order, 
health, morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. The manner in which States can ensure 
such compliance will be further examined in the following sections. 
As suggested by Gardner with respect to the Magyar case, intersectionality of Article 
9 and 11 has also resulted in a narrower margin of appreciation being granted to the state 
when compared to that afforded in discrimination law assessments under Articles 14 and 9.72 
A similar observation can be made in relation to pure church registration cases – if we admit 
that Magyar may not be one.73 
  
4.2 The ‘Exit’ Option (the ‘principle of voluntariness’) 
 
The ECommHR introduced the ‘principle of voluntariness’74 in early cases involving conflicts 
between employees and members of a church and the church itself.75 This assumes that the 
possibility of leaving the church would be a sufficient guarantee for the protection of rights of 
an individual under the Convention.76 For example, in X v. Denmark, the Commission held 
that since the applicant had chosen to join the church and serve as its minister, the principle of 
voluntariness justified the church’s wide discretion in respect of him.77 The ECommHR held, 
‘freedom of thought, conscience or religion is exercised at the moment [individuals] accept or 
refuse employment as clergymen, and their right to leave the church guarantees their freedom 
of religion in case they oppose its teachings’.78 Ian Leigh pointed out that viewing the exit 
option as the sole restriction on a church’s autonomy undervalues ‘what may be the high 
costs’ for those individuals choosing to make use of it;79 for example, to name just two drastic 
consequences: loss of employment and the loss of opportunity to continue to be a part of a 
shared spiritual community. It is not an overstatement to claim that the exit option has the 
effect of minimizing the enjoyment of individual rights, in this case the individual’s right to 
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78 Ibid. 
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religious freedom whilst maximizing the autonomy and freedoms of the religious 
organisation.  
When affording a very high degree of protection to the church’s autonomy and 
minimalist protection to the individual’s rights (in the form of the exit option), the 
ECommHR did not draw on the intersectionality between Articles 9 and 11.80 The 
Commission’s decision reflected the ‘traditional European jurisdictional approach to religious 
autonomy’ prevalent at the time in church employment cases – the approach which saw 
domestic courts declining to review decisions of churches and the processes underpinning 
them, because of the religious autonomy which these organizations enjoyed.81 In recent years 
the ECtHR has itself championed the abandonment of this approach; yet it is submitted that 
Article 9 and 11 intersectionality has come to play a similar (although not identical) role by 
ensuring that State interference with a church’s autonomy occurs only in exceptional cases.  
Before elaborating on this further, it is important to note at this stage that the State 
retains a positive obligation even under this minimalist exit approach. To illustrate, should 
this option be exercised by a group of individuals who seek to break away from a church in 
order to set up their own church, the State is under an obligation to ensure that they are not 
prevented from doing so. Steps which may need to be taken include the registration of the 
putative church’s statute and the granting of legal status, provided they fulfil the relevant legal 
criteria.82  
 
4.3 Procedural and Substantive Limitations 
 
The recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR rejects the traditional European jurisdictional 
approach to religious autonomy: where conflicts arise between the rights of individuals and 
the right of religious organizations to autonomy, the state must have in place a system of 
judicial supervision that secures both procedurally and substantively the rights of all.83 In case 
law concerning Articles 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11, the Convention mechanisms have set limits to 
church autonomy. It is noteworthy that one cannot identify a linear evolution in limiting 
church autonomy: from the exit option – the least intrusive form of restriction – to procedural 
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and substantive limitations that require heightened judicial scrutiny –, and finally to the 
assessment of the legitimacy of the religious beliefs of an organization – the most invasive 
approach.  
For example, in Maximilian Rommelfanger v. Germany, the ECommHR regarded the 
autonomy of the Catholic Church as qualified, whilst also acknowledging that the 
organization could not function effectively without its being able to impose certain duties of 
loyalty on its employees reflecting its values and convictions. However, this duty of loyalty, 
when imposed by the church through a contract, could not be unreasonable and ‘strike at the 
very substance of the freedom of expression’.84 Already in 1986, the Commission expected 
the Respondent State to ensure that procedural safeguards were in place and that a substantive 
assessment of the competing interests of the individual and the church be performed.85 Ten 
years later, in the Hautaniemi v. Sweden case, the Commission reverted to the exit option as 
the sole restriction on the autonomy of the Church of Sweden86 – in a laconic decision, it 
failed itself to inquire whether the State’s duty to ensure procedural and substantial guarantees 
has been fulfilled. In 2009, in Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy, the ECtHR articulated once more 
the procedural limits to church autonomy. States, the Court held, have a positive obligation to 
ensure that procedural guarantees aimed at securing the human rights of individuals exist in 
cases where religious organizations exercise their right to self-administration. Given the 
refusal of the Italian courts to hear the case, the applicant’s procedural guarantees had been 
effectively nullified.87 In 2014, in the Fernandez Martinez v. Spain case, whilst ultimately 
relying on the exit option, the Court also verified whether procedural guarantees were 
available and whether the rights of both the church and the applicant were substantively 
balanced against each other.88  
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It becomes clear that domestic courts which seek to solve conflicts between 
individuals and religious organisations by relying on the exit option alone, without 
performing an assessment of whether an individual or group of individuals enjoyed 
procedural safeguards and their rights have been duly weighed against those of the church, 
will fail the standards set by recent European jurisprudence. It is submitted that the 
Commission’s assessment in Hautaniemi would fall short of the current standards which the 
Court requires domestic judicial instances to uphold.  
The acknowledgment of church autonomy as a vital yet limited right cannot be 
understood absent its particular context. This context has been constructed by the ECtHR 
itself through the jurisprudential elaboration of positive obligations, which attach to virtually 
all Convention rights. It would have been highly unusual for the Court not to consider the 
positive obligations of States to secure the rights of individuals and groups of individuals in 
situations of their being in conflict with a religious organization – and these obligations in 
turn reveal the scope of the limitations to the right to autonomy of religious organizations, and 
their human rights duties.89 At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the threshold for 
State interference remains very high in such cases, which may result in an imbalance between 
the level of protection afforded to the two parties and which in practice favours the 
organisation at the expense of the individual. The intersectionality of Articles 9 and 11, acting 
as a signifier of the collective nature of church autonomy, appears to play a certain role in the 
creation of this imbalance, alongside other factors.  
In Obst, Schüth, Siebenhaar, Sindicatul ‘Păstorul cel Bun’ (Grand Chamber) and 
Fernandez Martinez (Grand Chamber), the Court constructs its reasoning along similar lines: 
first, it reasserts the grounding of church autonomy in Articles 9 and 11 and the centrality of 
the ‘autonomous existence of religious communities … for pluralism in a democratic society’; 
second, it observes that as a result of this , church autonomy admits of little to no State 
interference; it then acknowledges that the relationship between the State and religions is 
context-specific to each State.90 As a result of this three-pronged reasoning, the Court’s 
default conclusion seems to be that the margin of appreciation afforded to the state in cases of 
conflict between individuals and religious organisations (where the state acts as proxy for the 
latter) is wide. In each of the cited cases – except Sindicatul ‘Păstorul cel Bun’ – the margin 
is further buttressed by the Court’s assertion that what is at stake is a balancing between 
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‘individual and general interests’.91 In other words, the Court equates the interest of the 
church with that of the general public – and without further elaboration in the judgments 
themselves it is difficult to see why the church’s interest in securing its right to self-
administration can be reframed as the interest of the general public whilst the interests of 
individuals in securing their right to privacy, for instance, appears not to be amenable to such 
reframing. One can therefore only speculate whether it is the collective dimension of church 
autonomy – reinforced by the intersection between Articles 9 and 11 – which facilitates the 
transferral or projection of what essentially is the interest of a collectivity onto the general 
public.92 As such, it appears that the individual is at a disadvantage in such cases, because she 
is an individual. However, . Schüth provides evidence that this disadvantage can be 
countered:93  
 
As the case concerned a dismissal following a decision by the applicant concerning his 
private and family life, which attracts the protection of the Convention, the Court 
considers that a more detailed examination was required when weighing the 
competing rights and interests at stake … particularly as in this case the applicant’s 
individual right was weighed against a collective right.94  
 
On our reading, the Court in Schüth suggests that because what was at stake was a conflict 
between an individual right and a collective right, the potential favouring of the interests of 
the religious organisation because of its collective nature, a more extensive assessment by 
German courts was necessary in order to counter-balance such a tendency.  
 
 
5 Conclusion  
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As Roscoe Pound noted in 1949, ‘[w]hen it comes to weighing or valuing claims or demands, 
we must be careful to compare them on the same plane. If we put one as an individual interest 
and the other as a social interest we may decide the question in advance of our very way of 
putting it’.95 Pound posited that in balancing different claims – whether conflicting or 
overlapping – it is possible to reframe them as individual interests or as social interests and 
weigh them on the same plane to avoid bias.96  
Intersectionality between Articles 9 and 11 in disputes between religious organisations 
and the state can be seen as an artifice that has helped judges to craft the weighing of interests 
on the same plane: the collective interest of the organisation against the interest of the state in 
safeguarding public order, health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. This has 
resulted in acclaimed jurisprudence which has sought to strengthen the protection of newer or 
non-dominant religious communities in newly democratic countries or in contexts where they 
are struggling against authoritarian tendencies. In doing so, it has achieved a transformation 
of the concept of church autonomy from being the privilege of the few to being the right of 
the diverse many.  
The same intersectionality has had a different effect in the case of disputes between 
individuals/groups of individuals and religious organisations. The assumption of the Court 
appears to be that the collective interest of the church can be equated to that of the public. The 
result has been that the default position has become that the organisation’s interests weigh 
more than that of the individual. Beyond striking an uneasy note given the lessons of 
European history and of the human rights movement, Pound explains why this is a 
problematic way in which to approach any such legal conflict: it suggests that there is a 
potential bias which impartial courts should seek to avoid. Surely, the ECtHR would object if 
domestic courts, in their assessments of conflicts of interests between individuals and 
religious organisations started from the premise that the church’s interests are more valuable 
merely because they entail a collective dimension. It should, then, reconsider its own thinking 
in this regard. 
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